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1. Introduction 
 
Psychological construction represents an important new approach to psychological phenomena, 
one that has the promise to help us reconceptualize the mind both as a behavioral and as a 
biological system. It has so far been developed in the greatest detail for emotion, but it has 
important implications for how researchers approach other mental phenomena such as reasoning, 
memory, and language use. Its key contention is that phenomena that are characterized in (folk) 
psychological vocabulary are not themselves basic features of the mind, but are constructed from 
more basic psychological operations. The framework of mechanistic explanation, currently under 
development in philosophy of science, can provide a useful perspective on the psychological 
construction approach. A central insight of the mechanistic account of explanation is that 
biological and psychological phenomena result from mechanisms in which component parts and 
operations do not individually exhibit the phenomena of interest but function together in an 
orchestrated and sometimes in a complex dynamical manner to generate it.  
While at times acknowledging the compatibility of the mechanist approach with 
constructionist approach (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), proponents 
of the constructionist approach have at other times pitched their approach as anti-mechanist. For 
example, Barrett (2009) claims that the psychological constructionist approach rejects machines 
as the primary metaphor for understanding the mind, instead favoring a recipe metaphor; 
constructionism also purportedly rejects the “mechanistic” picture of causation, which it portrays 
as linear or sequential in nature (see also Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press). 
While some mechanistic accounts do fit this description, we will see that the mechanisms 
generating phenomena can be complex and dynamic, producing phenomena far less stereotypic 
and more adaptive than people often associate with machines.  Our goal, however, is not just to 
render constructionism and mechanism compatible. Philosophers of science have been 
examining the nature of mechanistic explanation in biology with the goal of gaining new insights 
into the operation of science. We will identify some of the places where the mechanistic account 
can shed new light on the constructionist project. 
The constructionist account of emotion is presented as an alternative to what Barrett 
(2006) calls the “natural kind” approach, which segregates emotion from other psychological 
kinds (e.g., perception, memory), differentiates and treats different kinds of emotion (fear, anger, 
happiness, sadness, etc.) as psychologically primitive, and treats these as causal processes in the 
mind that are ultimately to be localized in the brain either in distinct brain regions (e.g., fear in 
the amygdala) or in discrete neural networks. The categories emotion, perception, memory, etc., 
and the subdivision of emotion into fear, anger, etc., are parts of our folk accounts through which 
we describe our own and other agents’ mental states and activities. In that context they have an 
important role to play—they enable us to assess the individuals with whom we interact and 
coordinate our activities appropriately. They become problematic, for the constructionist and for 
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us, when they are viewed, as on the natural kind approach, as identifying basic activities 
performed in the mind. These mental activities are constructed from operations that are different 
in character, and which thus require a different vocabulary to be described. On our view, it is the 
orchestrated functioning of a mechanism operating in a particular physical and social 
environment (and shaped by its history in that environment) that exhibits these mental activities.  
The points of difference between the natural kind and constructionist approaches map 
onto fundamental issues highlighted in accounts of mechanism. On the mechanist approach, 
mechanisms are characterized in terms of the phenomena for which they are responsible. This 
makes the project of delineating the phenomenon critical since different types of phenomena 
require different explanations. The constructionist’s contention is that when we appreciate that 
emotions are constructed, we will be attuned to such things as the wide variability found in the 
facial expressions, behaviors, and physiology associated, for example, with fear. We concur with 
this, but emphasize in section 3 the need to develop nonetheless an account of phenomena that 
identifies regularities, for it is such regularities that become the touchstones of explanatory 
endeavors. In section 4 we will focus on what is the key element in mechanistic science—the 
appeal to component parts and operations of a mechanism. This requires decomposing the 
mechanism. It is out of the component parts and operations that the mechanist and 
constructionist both view mental phenomena such as emotions as arising; but here the mechanist 
can both give some perspective on why it is so difficult to identify component parts and 
operations of a mechanism and the historical process by which they have been identified in 
mechanistic sciences that are further along than psychology is at present. As a result of the 
emphasis on decomposition in mechanistic science, mechanistic accounts are often viewed as 
reductionistic. But, as we develop in section 5, accounts of mechanism also require attention to 
how the whole mechanism is organized and situated in its environment—a mechanistic account 
requires both a reductionist and a holist perspective. This becomes particularly important when 
the organization of the mechanism is nonsequential and the operations are nonlinear, as these 
conditions can give rise to complex dynamics. In section 6 we turn to one of the intriguing 
consequences of mechanistic research—it sometimes leads to a reconception, or what we call a 
reconstitution, of the initial phenomenon for which an explanation is sought. We consider 
whether psychological phenomena themselves need to be reconceptualized in light of the 
understanding of the mechanisms that generate them. Before turning to these issues, however, we 
begin with a brief primer on the new mechanistic philosophy of science. 
 
2. A Primer on the New Mechanistic Philosophy of Science 
 
If one consults traditional accounts of explanation in philosophy of science, one learns that 
explanation requires showing how the phenomenon to be explained follows from one or more 
laws together with some initial conditions (Hempel, 1965, 1966). While this nomological 
account of explanation may fit some cases in physics, it fares poorly in psychology, where there 
are few examples of laws and those laws which are to be found serve not to explain but to 
characterize phenomena in need of explanation (see Cummins, 2000, who notes that such laws in 
psychology are often called "effects"). It also fares poorly in biology (including neuroscience). 
When scientists advance explanations in both biology and psychology, they often speak of 
identifying the mechanism responsible for a given phenomenon. Responding to this, a number of 
philosophers of science have offered accounts of what counts as a mechanism in these disciplines. 
While the accounts differ in vocabulary and in some of their claims, they agree that a mechanism 
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consists of an organized set of parts performing different operations whose orchestrated 
functioning results in the phenomenon of interest1 (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993/2010; Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007; Darden, 2006; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000). A 
mechanistic explanation both describes the mechanism and shows how it gives rise to the 
phenomenon. For example, beginning with William Harvey in the 17th century, explaining the 
phenomenon of the circulation of blood in animals involved identifying the heart as the 
responsible mechanism and then showing how the periodic contraction and relaxation of the 
muscles in the various chambers and the opening and closing of the valves (operations involving 
specific parts) resulted in the phenomenon. Over time the phenomenon was more fully 
characterized, capturing for example the precise timing of the muscle contraction, and new 
components such as neurons were included in the account. Although eventually researchers 
found it useful to characterize the phenomenon and the operations involved mathematically, the 
parts and operations are central to the account. Researchers do not simply construct the law of 
heart behavior and derive the behavior of a heart given initial conditions from such a law.   
We have introduced the mechanistic account by contrasting it with more traditional 
accounts of explanation that present explanation as deriving a statement of the phenomenon from 
laws and initial conditions. The mechanistic approach also recasts a number of important issues 
in philosophy of science such as the format in which explanations may be represented and how 
scientists reason about mechanisms. Whereas it is natural to represent laws in propositions or 
equations, the challenge in understanding a mechanism is to grasp the types of parts and 
operations it employs and how these are organized. A diagram is often most effective in 
conveying this information. Logical deduction provides a way of showing that an instance (e.g., 
the movement of a given pendulum) follows from a law. But to see how a variety of operations 
generate a phenomenon, one must simulate the operation of the mechanism, either in a physical 
model, in one’s head, or in a computational simulation.2 Two issues on which mechanistic 
philosophy of science offers a different perspective than more traditional nomological ones will 
be of particular concern here.  
One involves reduction. In one sense familiar to scientists, mechanistic research is 
inherently reductionistic insofar as it appeals to entities and events at a lower level of 
organization—parts and operations—to explain the behavior of the whole mechanism. But in 
another sense, it is inherently holistic in that mechanisms must be organized and appropriately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The relationship between phenomena and mechanisms allows for multiple perspectives. Typically mechanistic 
philosophers of science have emphasized the delineation of the phenomenon as the reference point and construed the 
mechanism as consisting of whatever parts and operations are responsible for it. The same parts and operations may, 
on this view, be constituents of multiple mechanisms depending on what phenomenon one is explaining. However, 
sometimes researchers focus on the parts and operations constituting a mechanism, and then identify additional 
phenomena for which they are responsible. While there are contexts in which scientists operate in the latter manner, 
one reason to prefer the former approach is that mechanisms often do not come well delineated in nature (as they are 
more likely to in a human-made machine). Especially in biological systems, different components can be recruited 
into a functioning system when one activity is required and into another functioning system on another occasion. A 
similar problem arises with phenomena as well (biological phenomena are often integrated with each other) but in 
the context of a given research endeavor, the approach of the investigators provides a basis for characterizing the 
phenomenon for which explanation is sought. 
2 Recognizing that scientists sometimes model mechanisms via computational simulations is compatible with but 
does not entail that the modeled activities of the mechanism and/or their parts are themselves computational 
processes. A mechanistic approach in psychology is thus compatible with, but not necessarily committed to, a 
computational theory of mind which metaphysically characterizes psychological processes as computational or 
information processing activities.  
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situated in their environment in order to function. Accordingly, mechanistic accounts are multi-
level and do not privilege the lowest level.  
The second issue involves discovery. Advocates of the traditional nomological accounts 
of science generally eschewed discovery, focusing instead on justification. The reason was that 
while there was reason to hope that one could articulate processes of logical inference through 
which theories were justified (or at least could be falsified), there seemed to be little prospect of 
a logical specification of how one discovers laws (but see Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & Zytkow, 
1987; Thagard, 1988). Philosophers focused on mechanistic explanation have, however, 
identified some important aspects of how mechanisms are discovered. Of special relevance to us 
will be how reasoning can progress from initial proposals for localizing operations in the parts of 
a mechanism, to much richer accounts involving many parts that are organized in complex ways.  
 
3. The Challenge of Delineating Emotional Phenomena  
 
In referring to what is to be explained as a phenomenon, and considering examples such as 
biological respiration or encoding of long-term memories, it may seem as though phenomena are 
immediately apparent and obvious to anyone who looks for them. But in fact a great deal of 
scientific, often experimental, work is typically required to delineate phenomena in a manner that 
renders them appropriate as the target of explanation. Even something that we take to be basic to 
the life of mammals, circulation of blood, was not apparent even to physicians prior to the work 
of Harvey. Until then, physicians held that there were two distinct types of blood, arterial and 
venous, both of which flowed out from the heart to the peripheral tissues. Although Harvey 
himself was not able to show how the circuit from the arteries to the veins was completed, since 
capillaries were too small to be identified with the tools he had available, he presented what now 
seems like overwhelming evidence that the blood must circulate. First, he showed that the valves 
where the veins connect to the heart are oriented in the wrong direction for blood to flow out 
through the veins. Second, he calculated that the amount of blood that would have to be created 
from food on a regular basis if it were not recirculated vastly exceeded dietary intake. Finally, he 
showed that if veins were restricted in a limb, the limb would soon bloat from the amount of 
arterial blood reaching it. But none of this was compelling to many of his contemporaries, who 
insisted on the traditional account of the phenomenon in terms of two types of blood both 
traversing outward from the heart. 
It is not just obstinacy that renders phenomena challenging to identify. Rather, the 
activities that get characterized as phenomena and then explained typically depend on relations 
between entities that have to be identified. For example, Darwin had to notice how traits of 
organisms (such as the beaks of the finches he observed in the Galapagos) made them fit for the 
conditions in their environment. Previous theorists, such as Paley, whom he much admired, 
focused on the complexity of the characteristics of organisms, but only once Darwin identified 
traits as adaptive did it make sense to seek an explanation in a process such as natural selection. 
Moreover, sometimes quantification is required to delineate phenomena. It was widely known by 
anyone who thought about it that objects left unsupported near the surface of the earth drop. Yet 
it took Galileo to show that objects near the surface of the earth always fall 32 feet/sec2, a 
phenomenon that would later be explained by Newton’s law of universal gravitation.  
With this as background, let us turn to the phenomena we expect psychology to explain. 
Here several challenges arise. First, the English word “emotion,” like many other words in our 
mental vocabulary, likely refers to a host of different psychological phenomena that may share a 
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family resemblance but also exhibit great variability. This extends not just to our folk talk of 
emotions, but also to the use of the term “emotion” by scientists. One finds emotions presented 
as conscious feelings, cognitive states (e.g., appraisals), peripheral physiological responses (e.g., 
heart rate, respiration), and behavioral tendencies or overt behavior (e.g., facial, bodily, verbal); 
sometimes they are treated as collections of these mental and bodily phenomena (for reviews, see 
e.g., Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Prinz, 2004, ch. 1). Such differences are 
of fundamental importance from the perspective of mechanistic explanation since mechanisms 
are identified according to the phenomenon they explain. 
The challenge is apparent if one considers the question of where the mechanism 
responsible for emotion is located. For mechanists, a phenomenon and its mechanism are not 
separate entities, with the mechanism causing the phenomenon. Rather, the activity of the 
mechanism is said to constitute or realize the phenomenon of interest. So if bodily events are 
literal parts of emotions, then clearly the mechanisms of emotion cannot be purely in the brain. 
But if emotions are disembodied mental states that can have bodily effects (which are not 
themselves literal parts of the emotions), and if the mechanisms of the mind are indeed to be 
found in the brain, then mechanisms of emotion will be neural mechanisms. 
Second, as the constructivists emphasize (e.g., Barrett, 2006), emotional phenomena are 
highly variable. Episodes of fear, even when elicited in the same person by the same stimulus, 
show considerable variability in behavioral responses, autonomic activity, and subjective 
experience. The goal of a mechanistic account is not to construct a separate mechanism for each 
episode, but to identify a mechanism that accounts for regular patterns. The concept of a 
phenomenon, as presented by Bogen and Woodward (1988) as the appropriate target of 
explanation, involves regularities that can be exhibited repeatedly. This is not inconsistent with 
recognizing that each instance differs on a variety of dimensions, but it does require finding 
regularity even in variable instances. 
The relation between phenomenon, regularity, and mechanism is more complex than 
these remarks suggest. Not every well-established quantitative regularity constitutes a 
phenomenon to be explained by a separate mechanism. Rather, there is often a reciprocal relation 
between identifying a phenomenon and identifying a mechanism—as an account of the 
mechanism develops, it may enable us to account for a variety of regularities, which may then be 
grouped together as aspects of the same phenomenon. It is at this point that the constructionist 
contention that emotion is constructed from many of the same operations that figure in other 
cognitive activities becomes a serious issue for scientists.  
If the connections between components lead scientists to treat them as components of one 
mechanism, and we view all the activities to which this mechanism gives rise as aspects of the 
same phenomenon, then we have a recipe for an extremely problematic holism at least across 
biology and psychology.3 One of the consequences of identifying the molecular basis of many 
biological activities has been the discovery that many are shared and that there are important 
pathways by which the activities affect one another. For example, there is increasingly 
compelling evidence that NAD, a central component of metabolic activities, affects circadian 
rhythms, which have traditionally be assigned to different mechanisms. The consequence would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Russell (2009) seems to support the idea that psychological constructionism will involve a holism across 
psychology: “…the traditional assumption is that a ‘theory of emotion’ will differ from a theory of cognition, or 
behaviour, or conation. My claim, in contrast, is that any theory that explains all cases called emotion will be close 
to the whole of psychology, a theory that of course will not be limited to emotion but will extend to all 
psychological processes” (p. 1268). 
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seem to be that we should identify one phenomenon involving basic metabolism and circadian 
timekeeping. This same line of reasoning will quickly lead us to identifying only one biological 
phenomenon and one mechanism (the whole organism, plus perhaps its environment).  
If the goal is explanation, we must resist such thoroughgoing holism. In practice 
mechanistic scientists differentiate phenomena and avoid holism while acknowledging points of 
interaction between the responsible mechanisms. Thus they differentiate circadian time keeping 
from the myriad of related phenomena to which it and the mechanisms responsible for it are 
linked. Scientists in part make the decision as to what to count as one phenomenon and hence 
one mechanism pragmatically in terms of what they think they can productively integrate into 
one account. But if the decisions as to how to delineate phenomena are to generate scientific 
understanding, these decisions must also aspire to track actual distinctions in nature. The 
mechanisms identified with different phenomena will not be totally separable from each other, 
but each must have sufficient organizational coherence to make it appropriate to treat it as one 
mechanism responsible for one phenomenon (see the discussion of clusters in small-world 
networks below in section 5—different clusters may constitute mechanisms for specific 
phenomena but their behavior may be modified in real-time through the long-range connections 
to other clusters).  
The challenge this poses to delineating psychological phenomena and mechanisms is not 
simply resolved by adopting the mechanistic perspective, but it does give some guidance. The 
question of whether emotional phenomena and cognitive phenomena should be distinguished or 
whether some other differentiation is needed will in part turn on how successful researchers are 
at developing mechanistic accounts that distinguish them. It may be that one can maintain a 
productive distinction between emotion and some other mental phenomena and identify 
mechanisms that can be distinguished even if they are always interconnected. Likewise, it may 
be possible to distinguish particular emotion types from each other in the same manner. 
Here we do not take a stand on whether the constructionists are right in challenging the 
traditional distinction between emotion and other mental phenomena or between different 
emotions as distinct phenomena, but have only tried to show some of what is at stake from a 
mechanistic perspective. One thing that we hope to have made clear, though, is that the question 
is not whether there are totally distinct phenomena/mechanisms or totally integrated, but whether 
the phenomena and the mechanisms responsible for them are sufficiently differentiable that they 
can be treated separately or not. In the final section we return to the question of delineating the 
phenomena and whether the constructionists’ description of psychological phenomena so 
transforms traditional conceptions that they reconstitute the phenomena themselves. 
 
4. Decomposition and Localization 
 
Central to the mechanist approach to explanation is the idea that components parts perform 
different operations than the mechanism as a whole, and are organized and orchestrated to 
produce the phenomenon of interest. Thus, once one has delineated a phenomenon and linked it 
with an appropriate mechanism, a key task is to decompose that mechanism. Two types of 
decomposition are relevant to mechanistic explanation: decomposition into structural parts 
(structural decomposition) and into functional operations (functional decomposition). 
Decomposing in either way can be an extremely challenging endeavor—the appropriate ways of 
dividing a mechanism into parts or component operations is not just obvious to all those who 
look. It requires developing both the appropriate conceptual framework and adequate 
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experimental tools. On the conceptual side, researchers must develop the concepts for particular 
sorts of parts or operations and the vocabulary for identifying them.4 For example, in 
distinguishing regions of the brain, Brodmann (1908) had to construct the concept of brain areas 
distinguished by their cytoarchitecture. Likewise, in decomposing fermentation into component 
operations, biochemists needed concepts for the relevant different types of chemical reactions 
(oxidation, phosphorylation, etc.). In addition, researchers needed the requisite experimental 
tools for determining when these concepts are satisfied. Moreover, a given group of researchers 
may only have the tools for one type of decomposition, and indeed at a given time only one set 
of tools may be available in the scientific community. Brodmann aspired to distinguish brain 
regions that would perform distinct mental operations, but he had no tools for picking out such 
operations; and biochemists in the 1930s sought to link reactions with specific enzymes, but they 
could not determine the chemical constitution of enzymes (or even determine whether they were 
macromolecules or colloids). The ultimate goal, though, is to localize component operations in 
component parts of the mechanism, but the understanding of how to do so may only develop at 
the end of a sustained inquiry. 
The process of decomposing a mechanism takes place over time. The importance of 
functional decomposition is often ignored in the early stages of a mechanistic research project, 
where it is common to attempt to localize a whole phenomenon in a single part of the mechanism. 
For example, Broca (1861) localized the faculty of articulate speech in the left prefrontal region 
that bears his name and Buchner (1897) localized fermentation in a single enzyme he named 
zymase. Bechtel and Richardson (1993/2010) refer to this as “direct” or “simple” localization. 
Sometimes such localization is correct, but even when it is, it simply relocates the mechanism in 
a component of what was taken to be the mechanism. As such it doesn’t directly constitute any 
explanatory advance for it offers no account of how the phenomenon is produced. Yet, it can 
play an important heuristic role in opening a line of empirical inquiry.  
One can view what Barrett (2006) calls “natural kind” approaches to emotion as engaged 
in the project of directly localizing individual emotions in brain regions. She identifies basic 
emotion theories but also some appraisal theories as exemplars of the approach. What 
distinguishes these approaches is that: (a) emotions are a discrete, basic category of 
psychological phenomena distinct from perception, memory, reason, etc.; (b) fear, anger, 
happiness, sadness, etc., are discrete types of emotions, irreducible to more basic psychological 
phenomena; and (c) the discrete emotion types are localized in distinct areas of the brain, 
whether these are single brain regions or discrete networks. Lindquist et al. (2012) call this the 
“locationist approach.” What is characteristic of this approach is that the decompositions 
proposed in steps (a) and (b) are in terms of phenomena, not the operations realizing them. The 
reliance on such phenomenal decompositions (Bechtel, 2008) is extremely common in 
psychology. It was the strategy of the faculty psychologists, and provided the basis for Gall’s 
program of phrenology. Although faculty psychology and phrenology are widely denigrated 
today, the approach to decomposing psychological processes is evident in the division of 
psychological processes into categories such as memory, perception, and language, of memory 
into long-term versus short-term memory, and long-term memory itself into episodic and 
semantic memory. With the advent of fMRI, these have often provided the psychological 
activities to be localized in the brain. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mechanists agree with Barrett (2009) that “the categories at each level of the scientific ontology capture something 
different from what their component parts capture, and each must be described in its own terms and with its own 
vocabulary” (p. 332). 
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The constructionists’ contention is that the delineation of natural kinds of emotion “has 
outlived its scientific value and now presents a major obstacle to understanding what emotions 
are and how they work” (Barrett, 2006, p. 29). We agree that this approach needs to be 
supplanted by one that engages in decomposition of emotional phenomena into their operative 
parts and operations, and that these will not be properly characterized in the language of emotion, 
memory, or perception, but in more basic vocabulary that identifies the general operations that 
constitute the mind. But an important question is how to move forward to the promised land. 
Here it is important to recognize that even when it turns out to be incorrect, direct localization 
can be heuristically productive in the development of a science. One way it is so is by promoting 
the discovery of evidence that the part in which the phenomenon was localized is not the only 
part involved. Then researchers start to ask the question of what the various parts are doing, and 
this prompts finally decomposition into the contributions of the different parts. It can also bring 
the realization that different phenomena rely on the same part, prompting the question of what 
operation might be involved in these various phenomena. Lindquist et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis 
of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion is one recent example of this kind of research 
framed in opposition to direct localization accounts of emotion (see also Oosterwijk et al., this 
volume). 
While it is easy to identify examples where psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists 
have settled for simple localizations, neuroimaging (as well as the other main tool of cognitive 
neuroscience, analysis of lesions) has itself provided the evidence of the need to decompose 
psychological phenomena and not just localize them in the brain. In one of the first PET studies 
of cognitive processes, Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, and Raichle (1988) found that the verb-
generate task elicited increased blood flow in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior 
cingulate, and the cerebellum. Although much of the interest focused on the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, the researchers themselves were puzzled by the activity in the anterior 
cingulate and interested in what it and the cerebellum contributed. Moreover, the fact that nearly 
the same region of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex showed increased activation in a semantic 
memory task led Gabrieli, Poldrack, and Desmond (1998) to conclude that “operations may be 
the same whether they are considered in the context of language, working memory, episodic 
memory, or implicit memory. The left prefrontal cortex thus serves as a crossroads between 
meaning in language and memory” (p. 912). The current generation of neuroimaging studies that 
focus on networks of brain regions that exhibit synchronized behavior in the resting state and are 
then recruited in specific cognitive tasks (Mantini, Perrucci, Del Gratta, Romani, & Corbetta, 
2007; Fox & Raichle, 2007; van den Heuvel, Mandl, Kahn, & Pol, 2009; Sporns, 2010; Moussa, 
Steen, Laurienti, & Hayasaka, 2012) is the outgrowth of the earlier attempts to localize cognitive 
activities in single brain regions. Barrett and Satpute (2013) describe this transition in 
neuroscientific research on emotion and social cognition (see also Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). 
Attempts to directly localize phenomena in single components of an organism have often 
revealed the limitations of such an approach. In anticipating this, the vitalists (a diverse group of 
biologists from the 17th through the 19th century who rejected mechanist approaches to the 
activities of living organisms and often appealed to a vital force to explain these phenomena) 
were often correct in their objections to early proposals of mechanistic biologists. But whereas 
they lacked a positive research program of their own, an important virtue of the mechanist 
project was that it generated hypotheses for which falsifying evidence—e.g., that other parts 
were involved—could emerge, forcing researchers to address the question of what operations 
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they performed and to develop a functional decomposition of the phenomenon into multiple 
operations. 
As difficult as it often is to identify the parts of a mechanism, identifying operations can 
be even more challenging. The problem is that when the mechanism is functioning, the 
component operations interact smoothly so that the result of one operation feeds directly into 
others. Barrett (2009) captures this point when she comments “The contents of a psychological 
state reveal nothing about the processes that realize it, in much the same way that a loaf of bread 
does not reveal the ingredients that constitute it” (p. 330; however, we would prefer a better 
analogy since a loaf of bread is not an active mechanism). Often the clues as to the component 
operations must come from sources other than direct interventions on the mechanism such as 
lesioning or stimulating its parts. For biochemistry, for example, they were provided by organic 
chemists, who discovered that organic compounds are composed of groups such as hydroxyl or 
phosphate groups and that operations might consist of adding or removing whole groups or 
modifying them in predicable ways. With these operations in mind researchers could attempt to 
organize the different potential intermediates they identified when the reaction was interrupted at 
various points into comprehensible sequences of chemical reactions. 
Only in a few areas has it been possible to propose psychological operations out of which 
mechanisms responsible for psychological phenomena can be constructed. In the case of sensory 
systems it has been possible in some cases to identify the types of stimuli to which particular 
neurons are responsive—center-surround contrasts in the retina and LGN, oriented and moving 
edges in V1, illusory contours in V2, shapes in V4—and to ask then what sorts of information 
processing operations would enable the downstream region to identify a feature such as an 
illusory contour from representations of edges. Likewise, the discovery of different cells that 
respond to information relevant to navigation in the medial temporal lobe (place cells, head-
direction cells, grid cells, boundary-vector cells) has provided researchers a basis on which to 
hypothesize about the information processing operations that enable navigation by path 
integration. In many regions such as the hippocampus and surrounding areas the neural 
architecture provides both clues and evidence for hypotheses about the operations being 
performed. 
It is noteworthy that the examples in the last paragraph appeal to neuroscience to identify 
the information processing operations underlying the cognitive activities of whole agents (e.g., 
seeing or navigating). In contrast constructionists often focus on psychological primitives and 
appeal to examples such as categorizing and core affect as the basic operations (Barrett, 2009; 
Russell, 2003). There are, however, virtues in appealing to neuroscience in identifying operations. 
The first is that the operations to which constructionists appeal are often surprisingly close to the 
phenomena to be explained. Categorizing is an activity agents (even single-celled organisms 
such as bacteria) perform. Moreover, it is an activity that may be performed in different ways, 
relying on different operations. We worry that despite constructionists’ concern to supplant folk 
psychological operations with ones from which they are generated, they may have stayed too 
close to the folk level. This is not surprising since, short of insight from outside, theorists have 
few places to go to identify the component activities. However, we are sympathetic to the view 
that in appealing directly to the operations of the brain is to look to too low a level of 
organization to develop explanations of psychological phenomena. Contrary to some 
philosophical reductionists (Bickle, 2003), the goal in explanation is not to descend to the lowest 
possible level, but to the level at which operations are found out of which a mechanism can 
generate the phenomenon of interest. For many higher cognitive phenomena we need more 
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complex operations than those that might be performed by single-neurons. The virtue, though, of 
operations specified in terms of the neural architecture is that they are independently grounded 
and not just the projections of phenomena onto the mechanism that is to explain them. Even if, 
for many purposes, they are operations at too low a level of organization to figure directly in the 
explanation of cognitive phenomena, they do afford the prospect of identifying higher-level 
structures whose operations may be appropriate to the phenomena of interest. These might 
include neural columns or brain regions. Barrett (2009) is critical of the suggestion of appealing 
to columns on the grounds that they have many projections beyond themselves. This, however, is 
not a reason to reject them as the structures whose operations support cognition since we expect 
the parts of a mechanism to interact with each other to generate phenomena. 
A second concern is with the prospect of differentiating psychological and neural 
operations. Barrett’s (2009) proposal of psychological primitives seems to impose an 
unnecessary and unhelpful boundary between psychology and neuroscience. In mechanistic 
research there is always a level of decomposition that particular researchers, with the tools and 
techniques available to them, typically do not go beyond. Often this presents no problem—to 
explain the phenomenon they seek to explain, it is enough to show the parts and operations out of 
which it is constructed. They or someone else may then become interested in the components 
themselves, treat them as phenomena and seek to explain them mechanistically. This does not 
mean denying the higher-level construction! In going further down, these researchers are asking 
different questions and appealing to different types of parts and operations to explain the 
component mechanism. For purposes of explanation one may establish a level of parts and 
operations one takes as primitive, but there is nothing magical or necessarily psychological about 
the operations in terms of which one decomposes a phenomenon—especially given the lack of 
consensus over the nature of the “mental” or “psychological.” Researchers trained in and 
employing techniques of psychology may in fact identify and invoke the same parts and 
operations as someone trained in and employing the tools of neuroscience. One of the goals of 
inquiry in neuroscience is to identify the operations (information processing activities) various 
brain regions perform. As these are characterized, they may equally be employed by 
psychologists as the operations they invoke in psychological explanations.  
Identifying the parts and operations into which to decompose psychological phenomena 
remains a major challenge for psychology. It, however, is a challenge all mechanistic sciences 
face. Moreover, even if the early attempts have stuck too close to folk categories and so have not 
identified the parts and operations required to explain psychological phenomena, there is no 
reason for despair. In particular, collaboration with neuroscience may help generate higher-level 
psychological operations in terms of which the desired explanations can be developed. Barrett’s 
recent work (Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Lindquist & Barrett, 2012) appears to be taking these 
lessons to heart, by exploring intrinsic functional neural networks as the “core systems” realizing 
higher-level, domain-general psychological operations out of which emotions and other agent-
level psychological phenomena are constructed. In addition to using neuroscience as a guide to 
discovering higher-level psychological operations, Barrett’s newer terminology of “core systems” 
better suggests that these domain-general psychological ingredients are not essentially 
“primitive,” and can themselves be structurally and functionally decomposed into parts and 
operations. 
 
 
5. Decomposition and Recomposition 
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As we have stressed, the goal of decomposition is to identify parts and operations that contribute 
to the phenomenon but do not individually exhibit the phenomenon. The explanatory gain in 
explanation comes from understanding how components that don’t themselves exhibit the 
phenomenon can nonetheless exhibit it when working collaboratively. The challenge is to 
understand how such collaboration can yield the phenomenon. Again, in pressing this point we 
concur with Barrett (2009) that “there must be an explicit accounting (i.e., a mapping) of how 
categories at each level relate to one another” (p. 332). To emphasize how this endeavor 
complements decomposition, we refer to it as recomposition. Even though, just as in the case of 
decomposition, researchers may not literally put the parts back together, they must at least do so 
conceptually. 
Recomposition, however, turns out to be considerably harder than decomposition, as we 
have only the beginnings of an understanding of the consequences of different modes of 
organization. When humans think about combining operations, they tend to do so sequentially, as 
in an assembly line. The same holds true of scientists trying to recompose mechanisms. When 
operations are envisaged as sequentially ordered, researchers can recompose them in their minds, 
imagining the results of executing the first operation, then imagining the second applied to it, etc. 
Thus, one can imagine DNA being transcribed into various RNAs, them being transported to the 
cytoplasm, where tRNA binds with an amino acid and then with a locus on a mRNA, the amino 
acid forming a bond with the last amino acid to have been added to the polypeptide sequence, etc. 
Likewise, one can imagine visual perception resulting from processing first by center-surround 
cells in the retina and LGN, then by edge detection cells in V1, etc.  
This sequential conception of a mechanism has been enshrined in Machamer, Darden, 
and Craver’s (2000) characterization of a mechanism as operating “from start or set-up to finish 
or termination conditions.” It, moreover, is a factor behind the frequent view that mechanisms 
are impoverished in what they can accomplish and are not up to the challenges of producing 
cognition. For example, Barrett and colleagues’ (Barrett, 2009; Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & 
Barsalou, in press) critique of the “machine” metaphor for the mind often targets this linear 
organization as one its main inadequacies.  
This sequential conception of mechanism is, however, both inadequate to most biological 
mechanisms and vastly underestimates what can be accomplished when mechanisms are 
organized in a more complex manner. But the failure to look beyond sequentially organized 
mechanisms is not surprising, as it turns out to be very difficult for humans to understand how 
systems organized in a nonsequential manner will behave. One of the simplest departures from 
sequential order is negative feedback in which a process later in an imagined sequence affects 
the execution of an earlier one. Its first known use in human design was in Ktesibios’ 3rd century 
BC design for a water clock, but it had to be continually reinvented over the next two thousand 
years when designers sought to maintain a system at a target level. In the early 20th century it 
became more widely used and was then heralded by the cyberneticists as a fundamental principle 
found in both biological and social systems. 
Negative feedback is sufficiently simple that most people can grasp how it works in their 
imagination: as a furnace heats the air, it causes metal to expand, opening a switch, causing the 
furnace to stop. When the temperature drops sufficiently, the metal contracts, the switch is closed, 
and the furnace again generates heat. But while this use of negative feedback to control a 
mechanism so as to maintain or approach a target state can be intuitively understood, another 
important effect of negative feedback—that it can generate sustained oscillations—is even today 
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not widely recognized except by engineers who view it as a nuisance they seek to minimize. The 
reason is that by mentally simulating a system with negative feedback one cannot ascertain 
whether it will continue to oscillate or will dampen. Whether it will do so depends on whether 
the operations are appropriately nonlinear, a feature we cannot capture in our mental rehearsal. 
Confronted with nonsequential mechanisms with nonlinear operations, researchers adopt a 
different strategy to recomposing the mechanism: they mathematically or computationally model 
it by representing the operations in terms of differential equations and employ them in a 
computational model to simulate the functioning of the mechanism. 
The nonsequential, nonlinear nature of biological mechanisms not only serves to make 
them more challenging for scientists to understand, but also provides them with resources to 
behave in a manner very different from the way machines we have designed typically behave. 
Moreover, these behaviors are crucial to the ability of living organisms to maintain themselves as 
distinct entities, recruiting matter and energy from their environment and continually building 
and repairing themselves. Biological organisms are in this sense autonomous (Ruiz-Mirazo, 
Peretó, & Moreno, 2004). Autonomous systems are not just reactive systems; they are 
endogenously active. Endogenously activity is already manifested in the simplest life forms—
single-celled organisms without neurons or brains, including prokaryotes that lack differentiated 
organelles. Even such “simple” organisms carry out complex processing of information about 
their environment and use it to modulate their endogenous activity including motor behavior, a 
task for which animals employ a nervous system. This endogenously active feature of organisms 
carries over to brains—a signature of this endogenous activity is the oscillatory behavior that can 
be identified at a wide range of frequencies and shows up in the synchronized activity across 
networks in the brain (Abrahamsen & Bechtel, 2011). 
In rejecting the machine model for the mind, Barrett (2009) opts instead for the recipe 
model: mental phenomena are constructions in accord with recipes (see also Barrett et al., in 
press). But the entries in a recipe book are static entities, and only when utilized by a skilled chef 
do they figure in the generation of the rich variety of foods that we associate with them. It is the 
chef, not the recipes, that is critical to this process, and he or she does so as an endogenously 
active system engaged in ongoing, variable, interactions with an environment. We suggest that it 
is more appropriate to maintain the mechanistic perspective but recognize that the mechanisms 
involved in the brain involve nonlinear operations organized in complex ways that we are only 
beginning to identify and understand.5 One feature of brain organization that researchers are 
beginning to understand is that at different levels of organization it exhibits a small-world 
architecture in which units (neurons, columns, brain regions) are primarily connected to their 
neighbors but with a few long-range connections (Watts & Strogratz, 1998). The high clustering 
of local units allows clusters to specialize in specific types of information processing while the 
short path length enables these clusters to coordinate their activities as appropriate. The local 
clusters in such an organization can be viewed as specialized information processing 
mechanisms whose operations cognitive science and neuroscience are trying to identify. The 
mental activities and behaviors of cognitive agents result from the coordinated operation of many 
of these clusters as a person as a whole engages his or her environment. This is the conception of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Barrett et al. (in press) introduce two other supposedly “more apt” non-machine-based models for the relation 
between the mind and brain: “molecules that are constructed of atoms” and “chamber music emerging from the 
interplay of instruments.” Unfortunately neither quite captures both the nonlinear organization and endogenous 
activity we emphasize in the dynamic mechanistic perspective. 
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the functioning of the brain that the metaphor of construction is advanced to capture, and we 
suggest that when the complex dynamic behavior that is possible in mechanisms is recognized, 
their account is best served by the framework of mechanistic explanation. Cunningham, Dunfield, 
and Stillman (this volume) and Thagard and Schröder (this volume) offer examples of 
mechanistic accounts of emotion emphasizing a complex, dynamic organization of neural parts 
and operations.  
 
6. Reconstituting the Phenomena 
 
Mechanistic research is directed at explaining phenomena that have already been delineated. But 
as we have already noted, delineating phenomena is an ongoing activity and it goes on even as 
explanations are being developed. Researchers might devote considerable effort to explaining a 
phenomenon only to realize that it has quite a different character than initially assumed. In one 
particularly dramatic example, biologists spent over a century trying to explain the phenomenon 
of animal heat. For much of that time, heat was presumed to be an energy resource. In the 
process of trying to explain animal heat, researchers came to understand many of the important 
operations that go into basic metabolism. But eventually heat came to be recognized as a waste 
product—once free energy was turned into heat, it was no longer available to do useful work in 
living organisms. Only that energy which was captured in chemical bonds, such as those of ATP, 
is available for work. Bechtel and Richardson (1993/2010) refer to such revisions in the 
characterization of the phenomenon as reconstituting the phenomenon. 
 Does the fact that the operations performed in the brain are not themselves appropriately 
characterized in terms of the folk categories of emotion, thought, memory, self-knowledge, etc., 
entail that mental phenomena themselves should be reconstituted? Eliminativists in the 
philosophy of mind have long contended that these and other categories of folk psychology 
should be eliminated from science when they are found incapable of being reduced to the best 
available theory of how the brain works (Churchland, 1981). But the assumption that these 
categories track internal operations in the mind or brain may misrepresent their role in a 
fundamental way. Whole persons use folk psychological concepts to characterize themselves and 
other people, and these characterizations can have significant psychological and behavioral 
consequences. For example, if we can conceptualize what our goals are, we may be better able to 
identify and avoid acting on desires which are incompatible with them. And when we attribute 
beliefs and desires to others, we may be able to anticipate their behavior and better coordinate 
our own actions with theirs. These uses of folk idioms have consequences for behavior and so 
make them an appropriate focus of psychological research even if they do not track the basic 
operations of our mental mechanisms. 
Barrett (2012; this volume) and other psychological constructionists take a position along 
these lines about the psychological phenomena identified by folk categories. They treat emotion, 
cognition, etc., as genuine psychological phenomena, rather than endorsing their complete 
elimination from the science of psychology. But they endorse an alternative characterization of 
these psychological phenomena. Rather than being primitive categories of the mind, these 
phenomena are constructed from more basic psychological ingredients, many of which are 
shared across psychological phenomena the folk distinguish as emotional or cognitive. In the 
case of the different emotion categories, constructionists deny that they are distinguished by 
unique psychological ingredients (and the mechanisms that realize them). Rather, emotional 
episodes of anger, fear, etc., are ones in which core affect and other interoceptive and 
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exteroceptive sensory information are conceptualized by the agent as instantiating an emotion 
category. According to psychological constructionists, the psychological and behavioral 
components of emotional episodes do not exhibit the tight correlations assumed by natural kind 
theories of emotion. These psychological ingredients are involved in many phenomena that the 
folk distinguish as emotional and non-emotional. Emotional episodes in ourselves and others 
occur, for constructionists, when sets of these loosely correlated ingredients are conceptualized 
by an observer as an instance of an emotion category. This categorization process is a real 
phenomenon that can have psychological, behavior, and social consequences, which are to be 
studied by psychologists. It is just that these emotional phenomena do not exist independent of 
agents’ conceptualization process. Accordingly, Barrett (2012, 2009) describes emotions as 
“observer-dependent” phenomena, distinct from “observer-independent” phenomena whose 
existence does not depend on being recognized or conceptualized by minded beings.   
We accept this metaphysical distinction between entities which depend on minded beings 
for their existence and those which do not, but question its being given any special status. Many 
metaphysical categories, especially ones in biology, may be in this way relational—i.e., the 
metaphysical nature of the entities depend on their relations with other entities—without 
depending on the existence of minds. Niches are defined with respect to the traits of the 
organisms that inhabit them, and chemical attractants for bacteria are defined with respect to the 
organism’s chemical receptors. Further, we reject that the distinction between ontologically-
dependent and independent entities entails a sharp epistemological divide between folk and 
scientific concepts, or between psychological and neuroscientific concepts. Concepts across both 
divides are heavily dependent upon the theories and interests of human cognizers, and may not 
carve reality (whether it is mind-dependent or independent) at its joints.6 As humans, we have as 
much scientific interest developing categories that facilitate understanding of ourselves and 
directing our actions as we do those that characterize the physical, chemical, and biological 
processes that constitute us. 
Making these points, however, does not call into question the psychological 
constructionist view that some psychological phenomena are constructions rather than 
psychological primitives, and dependent upon the psychological concepts of the people under 
study. We agree that “Psychology must explain the existence of cognition and emotion because 
they are part of the world that we (in the Western hemisphere) live in” (Barrett, 2009, p. 330). 
This makes the study of emotion part of the larger interdisciplinary research program studying 
people’s folk psychological or “mindreading” abilities. It is a debated issue in the literature 
whether attributing mental states to oneself involves a distinctive sort of introspective access to 
our own mental states, or engages the same non-introspective methods we use to attribute mental 
states to others (e.g., Carruthers, 2009). The latter position can easily be accommodated by 
constructivists, since on this view the process of attributing mental states to others and oneself 
can be seen as a construction based on a variety of available evidence. But so can a version of the 
introspectionist account if the objects of introspection are restricted to the sensory states 
constructionists include in their accounts of emotion categorization. While much of the 
mindreading literature assumes that Western folk psychological concepts do reflect the actual 
architecture of the mind, some emphasize that the importance of mindreading depends on its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Although it may seem strange to say a metaphysical category that is constructed via the conceptualization of 
minded beings is not accurately conceptualized, this is not contradictory. It is possible for agents to use one set of 
concepts in unreflectively constructing the category, but use another set in their reflective thought about that 
metaphysical domain. See also Barrett (2012, p. 422). 
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usefulness in mediating social interaction and regulating one’s own behavior, rather than on its 
accurately describing our inner workings (e.g., Godfrey-Smith, 2004, 2005). Such accounts have 
clear affinities to psychological constructionism.  
We do not here take a stand on whether psychological constructionism is correct in its 
call to reconstitute psychological phenomena. From the perspective of mechanistic explanation, 
we emphasize that such revision in how the phenomena are described can be the result of 
research at the level of the whole—as when constructionists call into question the proposed 
correlations between the various behavioral measures of emotion—or the indirect result of 
research at lower levels investigating the mechanisms responsible for these phenomena. In the 
latter case findings such as that basic emotion categories fail to be localized distinct brain regions 
can motivate inquiry into whether these categories should or should not be retained at the level of 
characterizing persons. In the case of psychological constructionism, its central contention is that 
psychology has been restricted by its adherence to Western folk psychological concepts, 
especially in the case of emotion. While many folk concepts have been eliminated as science has 
progressed, folk psychological concepts have the unique status of being used by us humans to 
characterize ourselves, and thus partially constitute and influence our own minds. Folk concepts 
of emotion thus have an important place in psychological research, whether or not they 
accurately reflect the nature of our mental mechanisms. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have highlighted several ways that the new mechanistic philosophy of science 
can shed light on psychological constructionism. The mechanistic approach offers a multilevel 
framework for conducting research and explaining psychological phenomena in terms of more 
basic components. Research into the psychological construction of mental phenomena can 
benefit from mechanism’s emphasis on both decomposition of a mechanism into its basic parts 
and operations, and recomposing those parts into an organized whole that is environmentally 
situated. In this context, we can understand the move from natural kind theories of psychological 
phenomena to the psychological construction approach as the transition from simple localization 
to more complex and dynamic accounts of the neural mechanisms responsible for these 
psychological phenomena, and potentially to a reconceptualization or reconstitution of mental 
phenomena themselves.  
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1.     Is your work consistent with the hypothesis that emotions are psychological events 
constructed from more basic ingredients? Is it plausible that there are key ingredients 
from which emotions emerge? Are these ingredients specific to emotion or are they 
general ingredients of the mind?  Which, if any, are specific to humans? 
  
The mechanistic approach to philosophy of science we describe is not itself a theory of 
psychological phenomena such as emotion. Rather, it offers a framework for how discovery 
and explanation operate in sciences such as biology and psychology. Such a framework is 
thus not itself committed to the psychological constructionist hypothesis that emotions are 
constructions from more basic ingredients. But what philosophers have noticed about the 
processes of discovery and explanation for other biological phenomena do point in favor of 
psychological constructionism about psychological phenomena. It is common for scientists to 
initially identify a single entity as the mechanism responsible for a phenomenon, describing 
this part using the vocabulary originally reserved for the phenomenon of interest. Subsequent 
research, however, often reveals that this simple, direct localization of the phenomenon is 
false; they then find the mechanism consists of a host of interacting parts, each of which 
performs activities that are distinct from the phenomenon to be explained. This general 
pattern of finding complex, multi-part mechanisms is at a minimum consistent with, and can 
be seen to provide indirect support for, the psychological constructionist approach. In the case 
of psychological phenomena, mechanists agree with the constructionists that psychology 
needs to work to discover the more basic operations of the mind that are realized in regions 
and networks of the brain. Which if any of these basic psychological operations are unique to 
humans, and whether human-specific psychological phenomena involve the unique 
combination of psychological operations present in some nonhuman animals, are questions 
that cannot be answered a priori simply by adopting a mechanistic approach.  
 
2.     Which processes bring these ingredients together in the construction of an emotion? 
Which combinations are emotions and which are not (and how do we know)? 
  
The mechanistic approach is agnostic about how scientists should conceptualize emotions, 
and what particular parts, operations, and organization should be identified in a mechanistic 
explanation of emotional phenomena. Like in many other scientific inquires, everyday 
categories are a starting point for delineating mental phenomena; and if neural mechanisms do 
not respect these folk categories, conceptual revision of the type proposed by psychological 
constructionism could be necessary. A host of neuroscientific research does support the 
constructionists’ view that the brain does not respect the traditional division between “mental 
faculties” such as cognition and emotion. But researchers are only at the stage of proposing 
initial hypotheses about the basic psychological operations that will go into mechanistic 
accounts of mental phenomena such as emotion, so it is not yet clear how drastically we may 
need to revise our folk psychological categories. We do, however, believe a mechanistic 
approach offers some lessons about how this inquiry should proceed. First, we emphasize the 
importance of looking to neuroscience to guide such hypotheses, even if neuroscientific 
research will at times be at too low a level to immediately impact our mechanistic 
understanding of agents’ psychological phenomena.  Second, we should expect our emotion 
mechanisms’ parts and operations to be endogenously active and organized in a complex, 
nonlinear fashion.   
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